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Abstract 
Research reported by Thomas Homer-Dixon characterizes five social effects that can 
significantly increase the likelihood of violence in the emerging world, effects that are far deeper 
than can be controlled by security forces:  (1) constrained agricultural production, often in 
ecologically marginal regions; (2) constrained economic productivity, mainly affecting people 
who are highly dependent on environmental resources and who are ecologically and 
economically marginal; (3) migration of these affected people in search of better lives; (4) 
greater segmentation of society, usually along existing ethnic cleavages; and (5) disruption of 
institutions, especially the state.
1  These kinds of social effects create tensions that can erupt in 
violent expression.  It is difficult to envision how additional security forces will solve the 
embedded social problems that link violence with economic, social, ethnic, and even religious 
frustrations. 
This manuscript seeks to address these concerns.  Part I elaborates ways in which these 
issues of violence manifest themselves in a globalized economy.  Part II discusses the business 
implications of these tensions and suggests a way in which business can be a mediating actor to 
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lessen these tensions.  Part III concludes with a suggestion for a recharacterization of the 
corporation in a way to sensitize it to the ecological-mindedness necessary to address the 
potential issues of violence in societies. 
We propose sustainable peace as an aim to which businesses should orient their actions 
both for reasons of the good of avoiding the activities that contribute to the spilling of blood as 
well as for the good of sustainable economic enterprises, which are fostered by stable, peaceful 
relationships.  Thus, business must do what it does best and address economic development, 
even in terms of the extraction of natural resources.  But it must also be attentive to the rights of 
others, to the development of community and meaning, and to stop violence when it is likely.  
Given the dangers ecological stresses pose for the planet, it is hard to think of a more compelling 
reason to reorient business behavior. 
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“[E]nvironmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health, 
prosperity and jobs of American citizens. . . . [A]ddressing natural resource issues is frequently 
critical to achieving political and economic stability, and to pursuing our strategic goals around 
the world,” according to then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in the spring of 1996.
2  
“The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics,” observed Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in 1988, then Egypt’s minister of state for foreign affairs.
3  “Business is business, 
and capital, money, is a coward.  It is drawn to places which have the rule of law, places where 
there is an accountability of government, educated healthy workforces, secure working 
conditions.  Capital will flee – money will flee from corruption, bad policies.  It will flee from 
conflict.  It will flee from sickness,” according to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in fall of 
2001.
4 
From the pronouncements of these foreign policy leaders, it seems that business people 
have a profound interest in a stable allocation of natural resources as well as an environment 
relatively free from violent conflict.
5  The consequences of war involve the destruction of both 
human life and natural resources and directly impact business.  For instance, in the conflict 
between East Timor and Indonesia that began in the mid-1970s, the Indonesian Air Force’s use 
of napalm was not only a psychologically effective weapon against guerilla forces, it also 
destroyed forests, crops, and livestock, poisoned land and water and started forest fires.
6  In the 
1991 Gulf War, smoke and pollution from sabotaged oil wells reduced the life expectancy of at 
least 50,000 people, and between 1990 and 1992 infant mortality increased by 100%.
7  The 
destruction of water purification and sewage facilities resulted in raw, untreated sewage and 
chemicals being dumped into rivers and streets.  As a result, incidences of hepatitis increased 
from 1,816 cases in 1989 to 13,776 cases in 1992.
8  Thirty percent of hospital water was also 
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contaminated.
9  Thus, human and natural resources vital for the operation of business were 
destroyed. 
  In Kashmir, extensive deforestation resulted from skirmishes between India and Pakistan 
and 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus were relegated to refugee camps with limited health care.
10  The 
refugee situation was even more pronounced in the conflict in Mozambique from 1980-1992, 
where over five million people were displaced internally and 1.7 million others fled to other 
countries.
11  Deforestation has been a problem here too as has the destabilization of coastal 
mangroves and coral ecosystems.
12  
Location and disruption of public health infrastructures can have further devastating 
impacts on the rise of diseases; this may be a central aim of combatants.  In the Sudan, for 
instance, retreating troops intentionally destroyed hospitals and other health facilities.
13  With 
depleted medical care, incidents of malaria, typhoid, TB, and meningitis have now become 
common in southern Sudan.
14  The destruction of infrastructure generally has left people with no 
other choice than to turn to wood as a fuel, thus prompting deforestation; this also accelerates 
desertification of soil, and with fewer windbreaks, more topsoil is blown away by desert winds.
15 
  Of course, the results of warfare do not create the kind of conditions in which businesses 
typically flourish and the loss of economic vitality in each of these areas has been documented.
16  
Yet, the connection between problematic social effects, violence, and economics runs deep 
because industrialization of the global economy exacerbates social tensions.
17  Not surprisingly, 
the fastest growing industry around the world is security and private police protection; this was 
true even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
18  Security systems may provide a 
measure of stability and protection from violence, but the dynamics driving tensions around the 
globe are much deeper than can be controlled by adding additional (private or public) police 
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depressed the economies of countries around the world). 
17 HAWKEN, ET AL, supra note 1, at 8. 
18 Id.  
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officers.  At least in liberal societies, which most of the richest countries of the world emulate,
19 
extra security measures are likely to be a necessary but insufficient component of a solution 
toward the kind of stability needed for business to thrive.   
Indeed, research reported by Thomas Homer-Dixon characterizes five social effects that 
can significantly increase the likelihood of violence in the world, and are more complex than can 
be controlled by security forces:  (1) constrained agricultural production, often in ecologically 
marginal regions; (2) constrained economic productivity, mainly affecting people who are highly 
dependent on environmental resources and who are ecologically and economically marginal; (3) 
migration of these affected people in search of better lives; (4) greater segmentation of society, 
usually along existing ethnic cleavages; and (5) disruption of institutions, especially the state.
20 
These kinds of social effects create tensions that can erupt in violent expression.  It is difficult to 
envision how additional security forces will solve the embedded social problems that link 
violence with economic, social, ethnic, and even religious frustrations. 
This Article seeks to address these concerns.  Section I elaborates ways in which these 
issues of violence manifest themselves in a globalized economy.  Section II discusses the 
business implications of these tensions and suggests a way in which business can be a mediating 
actor to lessen these tensions.  Section III addresses a related issue concerning war and disease.  
The Article concludes with a suggestion for a recharacterization of the corporation in a way to 
sensitize it to the ecological issues  necessary to address the potential issues of violence in 
societies. 
 
I.  The Relationship Between the Physical Environmental and War 
This section describes four ways in which ecological issues connect with warfare and directly 
impact violence.  These involve: (1) resource scarcity resulting in competition for resources; (2) 
exacerbation of identity-based tensions, resulting from either competition for scarce resources or 
from ecological degradation; (3) the impact of disease either as a weapon in its own right or as a 
consequence of the degradation of infrastructure; and (4) broader issues of sustainability in the 
face of increasing populations and increasing industrialization.  
                                                 
19 See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC 
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (arguing that the simultaneous adoption of majority-rule democracies and 
free markets is a recipe for violent, ethnic clashes in developing countries). 
20 THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 80 (1999).  
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A.  Resource Scarcity and Implications for Business 
Contests among nations and states for valuable resources are nothing new.  Much of 
colonial history resonates with the drive for acquisition of material goods, whether gold, spices, 
fur, or other items.  The days of European conquests of the New World may have abated, but 
violent contests for natural resources still occur throughout the world.  Consider in Africa,
21 the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where six countries are fighting to control gold, copper, 
diamonds, and timber.
22  Although Western interests in Middle Eastern oil tend to be more 
concerned with protecting access to petroleum rather than controlling it to the exclusion of other 
countries, it is not inconceivable that disputes for oil could turn into battles over controlling the 
resource.   
The raw contest for control of resources by nation-states who simply need or desire 
wealth is one example of how the physical environment connects with potential conflict.   
Michael Klare names three other kinds of conflict, where the control over the natural resource is 
connected to genuine sovereign claims of nation-states.
23  The first of these occurs when the 
supply of a natural resource extends across the boundaries of adjoining sovereign states.  This is 
the case, Klare says, with an underground oil basin or a large river system.
24  As noted in the 
opening quotation from Boutros Boutrous-Ghali, Egypt’s insistence on controlling the waters of 
the Nile has historically put it at odds with upstream African nations, such as Ethiopia and the 
Sudan.
25  Similarly, the concern that an adjoining country that shares a resource might make 
excessive use of it was one of Iraq’s complaints against Kuwait in 1990.
26  A second point of 
contention can arise with respect to an offshore mineral resource where, by exercising sovereign 
rights of up to two hundred miles under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
27 
multiple states may claim ownership of minerals located in relatively small bodies of water, such 
                                                 
21 See, e.g. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS 5-6 (1998) (noting the vast material wealth of the African 
continent and the interest of countries in exploiting that wealth). 
22 Fishman, supra note 3, at 37. 
23 See generally, KLARE, supra note 2. 
24 Id. at 19. 
25 See, ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE (2002) (for a history of the ecological dimensions of the Nile River, 
particularly as effected by various hydroelectric projects, the attempts to control the river, and the geopolitical 
rivalries spawned by issues of such control). 
26  Id. at 22. See also Philip K. Verleger, Understanding the 1990 Oil Crisis, THE ENERGY J., Oct. 1990, at 15 
(asserting that preceding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was 
stealing oil from the disputed Rumaila field and producing in excess of its OPEC quota). 
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M 1261.  
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as in the Caspian Sea.
28  Third, disputes over control of bodies of water, such as the Persian Gulf 
or the Suez Canal may cause conflict as well.
29   
Disputes over any of these four resource-based issues may well spill over into other 
contests relating to ethnic tensions, as will be described later, but they are important in their own 
right.  In particular, consider the potential problems with respect to the resources of oil and 
water. 
 
1.  Mixing Oil and Water: The Economization of Foreign Policy 
Oil and water are critical for industry.
30  Moreover, oil and water are also finite resources 
that can foreseeably become exhausted in the twenty-first century.  Estimates of global oil 
supplies suggest that there is enough oil to sustain global requirements into the middle part of the 
century with potentially significant shortages occurring in the second or third decade of this 
century.
31  Similarly, although the earth has vast quantities of water, only three percent is fresh 
water, including a significant amount of that in polar ice caps and glaciers.
32  With population 
growth and higher standards of living, the middle part of the twenty-first century may also see 
100% usage of the available supply of fresh water.
33   
Similarly, petroleum-based fuels currently account for ninety-five percent of the world’s 
consumed transportation energy.
34  There is every reason to believe that the demand for oil, for 
both transportation and other energy uses, will increase substantially in the future, particularly in 
Asia and Latin America.
35  In China and India alone, countries home to almost half of the 
world’s population, oil consumption is projected to rise 3.8% annually.
36  From 1990 to 1996, 
                                                 
28 KLARE, supra note 2, at 22. See also Paul Thomas, Geopolitics Around the Caspian, ENERGY ECONOMIST, Sept. 
1993, at 16 (explaining the various regions surrounding the Caspian and Aral Seas and the conflicts and politics 
therein). 
29 KLARE, supra note 2, at 22. 
30 Id. at 19. 
31 Id. See also James J. MacKenzie, Heading Off the Permanent Oil Crisis, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Jun. 1996, at 
48 (finding that the rate of production of oil producing countries will decline rapidly in the coming years as crude oil 
supplies are consumed). 
32  KLARE, supra note 2, at 19. See also Barry James, Less Water and Less to Eat, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 
2002, at 1 (asserting that only one percent of fresh water is available for human use, as the remainder is trapped in 
the ice caps and glaciers). 
33 KLARE, supra note 2, at 19. 
34 Id. at 36-37. 
35 Id. at 38 (Asia and Latin America are particularly susceptible to increases in need for fuel due to development and 
rapid industrialization). 
36 Id.  
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the Chinese economy expanded by 93%.
37  The Department of Energy expects energy 
consumption to grow by 3.4% annually in Brazil, 3.0% in Mexico, and 3.7% in India between 
1997 and 2020.
38  It is estimated that by 2020, these four countries will require 151 quadrillion 
BTUs of energy, or three times the amount needed in 1990.
39  With such increasing demands, 
pressure will likely be applied to the supply of petroleum.  Based on studies done by BP Amoco, 
there are 1,033 billion barrels of oil in existing reservoirs that could be extracted under “existing 
economic and operating conditions.”
40  Others estimate additional “unproven” reserves of 200 to 
900 billion barrels.  If the unproven reserves are averaged so as to expect a supply of 1,600 
billion barrels being consumed as a current rate of 73 million barrels a day (as of 1999), the 
current supply would only satisfy demand for sixty years.
41  This estimate itself places 
exhaustion of oil supplies within the life expectancies of children born at the turn of the 
millennium, but if the Department of Energy’s projection that worldwide oil consumption will 
rise by 1.9 percent per year between 1998 and 2020 is correct, the resulting consumption of 113 
million barrels of oil a day would result in depletion of world oil stocks by 2040 rather than by 
2060.
42   
This supply-demand dynamic places the reliance on fuel for industrialization and 
transportation within sight of exhaustion.
43  This could mean that countries will develop other 
sources to fuel economic development.  It also could mean that the intensity of competition for 
oil could increase.  Because of this dynamic, it is not surprising that many countries have now 
announced “the economization of foreign policy.”
44   
  Without undertaking a long historical analysis of the connection between economic gain 
and foreign policy, three important moments in the last sixty years – 1941, 1973-74, and 1989 – 
demonstrate why countries tend to consider natural resources a cornerstone of their foreign 
policy.  In World War II, for instance, Japan’s attempt to gain control over the Dutch East Indies 
oil producing region triggered the 1941 U.S. oil export embargo on Japan, which in turn led 
                                                 
37 Id. at 16. 
38 Id. at 17; see also INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo. 
39 KLARE, supra note 2, at 17. 
40 Id. at 41. 
41 Id. at 42 (noting that this is a conservative estimate that assumes a static rate of global consumption). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 42-43. 
44 Id. at 10 (this economization is a result of giving more strategic significance to economic and research concerns, 
i.e. U.S. protection of critical resources and trade routes).   
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Japan to conclude that war with the United States was inevitable.
45  Meanwhile, Germany’s need 
for oil prompted, at least in part, its 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.
46  The 1973-74 disruption 
of oil supplies to the West by oil exporting countries in the Middle East not only prompted the 
West to look for other oil supplies (such as in the North Sea and Alaska), but also led to 
pronouncements by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975 and by President Jimmy Carter in 
1980 that the U.S. would go to war to protect Persian Gulf oil supplies.
47  Since the end of the 
Cold War in 1989, emerging and post-communist countries have tried to adapt to the free market 
and, in doing so, faced the issue of the need for resources to support economic development.  
Thus, Russia’s President Putin, in 2000, announced a doctrine in which one of the purposes of 
the country’s military would be the “creation of the conditions for the security of economic 
activity and protection of the Russian Federation’s national interests in the territorial seas, on the 
continental shelf, and in the exclusive [offshore] economic zone of the Russian Federation and 
on the high seas.”
48  Similarly, China has focused more of its military attention on the South 
China Sea, with its reserves of petroleum and natural gas, and Japan has adopted a defense 
program to protect shipping lanes around the country.
49  In part, these efforts are simply a 
continuation of any sovereign’s attempt to protect resources important to a given political entity, 
but when economic development becomes central to a country’s foreign policy, then protection 
of resources necessary for that development becomes critical.
50 
This economization of foreign policy has two particularly significant consequences.   
First, competition is increasingly acute because the supply of oil is concentrated in a few places, 
a concentration sometimes called the "Strategic Triangle.”
51  Second, the competition is not 
simply among nation-states, but businesses, particularly multinational corporations, are also 
enmeshed in the competition among countries. 
                                                 
45 Id. at 31. See also Eric Black, Why Did Japan Decide to Attack Pearl Harbor?, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS-ST. 
PAUL), May 25, 2001, at 11A (asserting that Japan had no intention to attack Pearl Harbor until the U.S. embargo 
drove them to seek out the Dutch East Indies region and to try and stop the U.S. Navy from interfering with the 
plans). 
46 KLARE, supra note 2, at 31. 
47 Id. at 33 (Kissinger stated to Business Week magazine that the U.S. would be willing to go to war over oil 
supplies, although he was reluctant to use force, while Carter asserted that the U.S. would use any means necessary 
to protect its interests in the Gulf, including military force). 
48 Cited in KLARE, supra note 2, at 11. 
49 Id. See also Ben Barber, Beijing Eyes South China Sea With Sub Purchase, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at A13 
(stating that China intended to buy 22 submarines from Russia in order to pursue its interests in the Sea). 
50 KLARE, supra note 2, at 14. 
51 Id. at 49 (the Strategic Triangle is the region stretching from the Persian Gulf in the west, to the Caspian Sea in the 
north, and to the South China Sea in the east).  
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2.   Oil Flashpoints:  The Strategic Triangle 
The Strategic Triangle refers to a region stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian 
Sea and then to the South China Sea.
52  These areas possess huge, significantly undeveloped 
sources of oil and natural gas as well as numerous, unresolved territorial disputes.
53   
  The issues surrounding the Persian Gulf need little elaboration.  The region has been the 
site of two major interventions by the West, led by the United States and Great Britain, in the 
past twelve years, as well as the feature of disputes between powers in the region including 
between Iraq and Kuwait (and various other parties in the 1991 Persian Gulf War),
54 Iraq and 
Iran,
55 Turkey and Syria,
56 and Turkey and Iraq.
57  In addition, because of the unequal 
distribution of oil revenues benefiting royal or business elite, there is resentment within Middle 
Eastern countries, often linked with religious dimensions, even though the governments of such 
countries have provided relatively generous benefits to the general population in terms of 
education, health care, food, and housing.
58  Connected with the interests of Western countries 
that have intervened in the region, the volatility of the region is well known.  Because of the 
dangers of relying upon oil from the Middle East, the United States and other countries have 
sought to diversify by shifting their sources to other regions.
59  As a result, new areas of 
development, in regions such as Africa, the Caspian, and Latin America, have become more 
prominent suppliers of U.S. petroleum needs.
60  Yet, events suggest that these new locales are 
not panaceas for stable extraction.  The Sudan oil industry, for instance, has become a $1 million 
per day profit-maker for the Sudanese government, but the profits seem to have sponsored 
government war-making capability and activity.
61  Venezuela, South America’s major oil 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 49-50 (the Strategic Triangle accounts for about half of the current world oil production and three quarters 
of the currently identified reserves). 
54 John Omicinski, U.S. in for the Long Haul With Persian Gulf Mission, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at A2 
(stating that in 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and instigated the Persian Gulf War). 
55 Jay Tolson, Iraq: After Sadaam, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 28, 2003, at 27 (chronicling the history of Iraq 
and the 8 year war that began in the 1990s). 
56 Scott MacLeod, Syria: The Peace Conflict, TIME, Oct. 18, 1999, at 56 (stating that Syria has a crucial dispute with 
Turkey, since Turkey controls Syria’s main water source, the Euphrates). 
57 Jeffrey Fleishman, Turkish-Kurdish Rift Muddles War Plans, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at A10 (outlining the 
history of the troubled relationship between Iraq and Turkey). 
58 KLARE, supra note 2, at 53. 
59 Id. at 46.  
60 Id. (quoting the National Security Council as saying Venezuela has become the number one source, and Africa 
supplies 15 percent, of oil in the U.S.). 
61 Fishman, supra note 3, at 36.  
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producing nation, has been gripped by social and labor unrest.
62  Two additional potential 
sources for oil and natural gas – The Caspian Sea Region and the South China Sea Region – 
merit further exploration. 
a.  The Caspian Sea Basin 
The Caspian Sea Basin may hold the world’s second or third largest reserve of oil along 
with a significant amount of natural gas.
63  Projections of its size are ambiguous, but according to 
some estimates, it holds as much as 270 billion barrels of oil, approximately twenty percent of 
the world’s proven petroleum reserves, an amount second only to the Persian Gulf’s 675 billion 
barrels.
64  In addition, the region holds 665 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – about 12% of the 
world’s total reserves.
65   
The region’s attractiveness as a supplier of oil as an alternative to the Middle East has 
garnered the attention of the United States, but American interests are also of concern to Russia, 
which considers the Caspian region to be part of its traditional sphere of influence.
66  Beyond the 
U.S.-Russian contest for influence, there are “contests boundaries and territorial disputes, the 
prevalence of authoritarian regimes, severe economic disparities, long-standing regional 
rivalries, and a cauldron of ethnic and religious strife.”
67  These animosities have produced 
fighting in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Dagestan as well as conflicts between Russia and 
Chechnya.
68 
  Interestingly, however, competition for influence in the Caspian region does not so much 
involve jockeying among the United States, Russia, local governments, Turkey and Iran,
69 but 
among the companies that will do the actual work of drilling, refining, and selling the oil.  After 
all, although governments gain influence and revenues, whether through taxes and fees or, more 
sinisterly, via bribery and kickbacks, precious few governments actually engage in the oil 
business.  In the Caspian region, the companies seeking to negotiate contracts include BP-
Amoco, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, Elf Aquitaine of France, Agip of Italy, Stat-
                                                 
62 Scott Wilson, Political Deadlock Bolsters Chavez; Venezuelan Leader Exploits General Strike to Remake 
Institutions, Opponents Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2003, at A15. 
63 KLARE, supra note 2, at 81. 
64 Id. at 2 (citing U.S. Department of Energy figures). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 83. 
67 Id. at 81. 
68 Id. at 82. See also Chaos in the Caucasus, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 23 (quoting newspaper columnists in 
Moscow as describing the fight between Russia and Chechnya as a war between “civilization and barbarism”). 
69 KLARE, supra note 2, at 84.  
 
10 
oil of Norway, Lukoil of Russia, and the China National Petroleum Corporation, and most 
attempt to partner with state-owned local concerns.
70  To succeed, however, the companies and 
the governments must be able to work without an established framework for determining who 
has rights to offshore drilling in the Caspian Sea.
71  Perhaps more significantly, there are also 
issues concerning how to transport the oil and natural gas to port because the Caspian Sea is 
landlocked.
72  As a result, the oil and natural gas will need to pass through pipelines.
73   
  Passing oil through pipelines is not a benign decision.  Indeed, in Afghanistan, the 
decisions made to determine where Russian oil should pass had dark consequences.  After the 
Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the country fell into chaotic struggles for control, with 
no clear authority in the country.
74  In 1994, some ex-mujahideen fighters allied with Mullah 
Mohammed Omar challenged the stronger warlords.  In the meantime, several oil companies 
wished to build a pipeline across Afghanistan to carry oil to Pakistan, seeing the potential for 
revenue from shipping and transportation if the oil were transferred from Pakistani ports to 
tankers headed to oil dependent countries.  All the while the success of Mullah Omar did not go 
unnoticed.
75  Impressed by Omar’s success, the Pakistani government provided aid for Omar’s 
group, which the Pakistanis named “the Taliban,” to expand its control from Kabul and 
Kandahar to the rest of the country to secure the corridor necessary for the pipeline.
76  The 
subsequent history of the Taliban is now, unfortunately, well known after its support of Osama 
bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist organization was unearthed.
77  The interesting feature, 
however, is that in business’s desperate, and to use Secretary of State’s Colin Powell’s term, 
cowardly,
78 need for stability it may seek governmental assistance from sovereigns uninterested 
in providing justice.  In other words, the choices corporations make in maximizing their 
profitability, particularly in areas of the world where there are major risks of violence, are not 
benign. The choices to be made by both governments and businesses, in building pipelines, for 
example, have proven to have significant negative spillover effects. 
                                                 
70 Id. at 86-87. 
71 Supra notes 65 to 67 and accompanying text. 
72 KLARE, supra note 2, at 88. 
73 Id. 
74 Nazif M. Shahrani, War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 715, 720, (2002). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Michael Elliot, Special Report: The Secret History, TIME, Aug. 12, 2002, at 28 (explaining the history of the 
disputes for control of Afghanistan and the history of Al Qaeda). 
78 Fishman, supra note 3, at 34.  
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  b.   The South China Sea 
As noted above it is anticipated that Asia’s economic development will spur additional 
demand for energy.
79  China’s energy needs are expected to double between the years 2000 and 
2020 and Japan’s needs are expected to increase by twenty-five percent within the same time 
period.
80  Together, this would result in these two countries consuming twenty percent of world 
energy by 2020 - an amount that is equivalent to the consumption of all of Western Europe and 
Latin America combined.
81  China can turn to coal, which it possesses in abundance, but burning 
coal results in significant air pollution as well as major contributions to greenhouse gases.
82  
Given China’s desire to be the dominant Asian power, as well as its desire to not become 
dependent on foreign sources of energy, one would expect it to turn its attention to the South 
China Sea, which it has.
83  In 1992, China formally claimed two islands – the Spratley (a 
collection of a few hundred rocks, reefs, and inlets covering over eighty thousand square miles, 
scattered throughout the Sea, and claimed by five other nations)
84 and the Paracel Islands – 
demonstrating de facto authority over the South China Sea.
85  In turn, China then provided 
drilling contracts to several western companies off of the coast of Vietnam and expanded its 
military force in the region.
86  That region, bordered on the North by Taiwan and China, on the 
West by Vietnam, on the South by Indonesia and Malaysia, and on the East by the Philippines, is 
a vibrant region of burgeoning economic development, as is nearby oil-dependent Japan and 
South Korea, with their own thirst for crude oil and gas.
87  In addition, shipping from other areas, 
such as the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, generally cuts directly across the South China Sea 
so that control of the Sea implies not only extractive, but also transport sovereignty.
88 It may well 
be that countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan wish to benefit from the extraction of 
oil from the South China Sea, but regardless, control of the Sea creates potential difficulties for 
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each of these countries.
89  The explosive part of this scenario involves the overlapping claims for 
economic development rights in this region and the military means to enforce those claims.
90  A 
clash already occurred in 1995 between China and the Philippines over a small islet called 
Mischief Reef.
91 
  One question for South China Sea development involves the potential willingness of 
various countries to go to war for the zones they claim.  Although with respect to all oil 
development involving unsettled claims of sovereign control, whether in Africa, the Caspian Sea, 
the Middle East, or the South China Sea, the actions taken by corporations to contract with 
various governments affects geopolitical resolutions of power and influence.  Oil, in short, is not 
simply about governmental decisions, but also about competition among oil companies.   
 
  3.  Competition for Water 
  Related to the issues presented by competition for oil are the similar and perhaps more 
volatile issues surrounding competition for water.  With almost three hundred river basins 
crossing national boundaries
92 and a six-fold increase in worldwide water use between 1900 and 
1995,
93 it is not surprising that many commentators predict that contests for water will be a 
source of violent conflict in the twenty-first century.
94  Like oil, water crosses boundaries, giving 
rise to potential disputes over its use.
95  Additionally, water supply is finite and once readily 
known supplies are depleted, it is very costly to obtain additional amounts.
96  And with the use of 
water so dramatically increasing, flashpoints are bound to occur.  An additional unknown factor 
is the potential impact that may result from changes in the global climate.
97 
  More specifically, flashpoints revolve around increasing needs for water as a result of 
increasing populations.  These include both needs for drinking water and water for industrial and 
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agricultural use.
98  The World Bank estimates that each person requires 36 to 72 cubic meters of 
water annually to survive.
99  This number does not include agricultural, industrial, and energy-
related production; together, these additional uses dramatically raise each person’s yearly needs 
to approximately 1,000 cubic meters per year, or as much as seventy percent of the world’s 
freshwater supply with the largest use being for agriculture.
100   
  The combination of increasing population and inaccessibility of much of the fresh water 
supply complicates its efficient distribution.  Increasing populations mean that more people need 
water to drink, and more land devoted to agriculture.  Yet, most of the world’s arable land is 
already under cultivation, so that to make additional land productive, irrigation will be required.  
Irrigation is dependent on accessing remote water supplies.
101  To make matters worse, human 
beings are able to access less than one percent of the world’s fresh water supply because most of 
the earth’s water is trapped in the polar regions and glaciers.
102 After precipitation, evaporation 
and transpiration, the balance of the annual replenishment of the earth’s water supply amounts to 
forty thousand cubic kilometers.
103  Half of this is currently lost through flooding and another 
twenty-percent is carried off into inaccessible locations, such as Siberia.
104  This leaves only 
12,500 cubic kilometers of water annually renewable for various human uses, an amount that is 
probably double existing population needs.
105  Yet, affluence tends to increase water use; for 
instance, the world’s population doubled between 1950 and 1990, but water use (resulting from 
indoor plumbing, appliances, and the consumption of meat) increased by three hundred 
percent.
106  It is foreseeable that, with increased population and increased affluence, human 
beings could fairly quickly reach all of the renewable freshwater and, although underground 
aquifers are available, once they are used, they – like oil reserves – cannot be replenished.
107  
Desalinization is a possibility but is currently very costly.  An additional perhaps more 
significant difficulty is that water availability is not evenly dispersed, but is instead concentrated 
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in areas that are either already impoverished or also struggling with potential conflicts regarding 
oil.
108  The Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia are particularly prone to water shortages 
and huge population increases.  They are also already the subject of territorial disputes, some 
connected with petroleum.
109  
With many groundwater resources traversing existing national boundaries and with 
predictions that by 2025 two-thirds of humanity will suffer from moderate to severe water stress, 
the opening quotation from Boutros Boutros-Ghali
110 that future wars will be fought over water 
may bear some truth.  In addition to the Nile, which is shared by several countries, four countries 
share the Tigris-Euphrates system and the Jordan River is shared by three countries and the 
Palestinian Authority.
111 
In contrast to Boutros-Ghali’s assertion that future wars will not be about politics, but 
water scarcity, it is important to see that politics is inherently a part of the water conflict.  First, 
water conflict tends to exacerbate ethnic tensions that already exist within a given region or 
country.
112  Second, the nature of water flow, particularly with respect to rivers, tends to favor 
the upstream states that control the flow.
113  Disputes occur not only among countries, but also 
within countries such as in India, where farmers in adjoining states have fought over irrigation 
rights to the Cauvery River and even in the United States, when in the 1920s farmers in eastern 
California sabotaged the aqueduct system carrying water to Los Angeles.
114   
  Launching hostilities over water historically has occurred as a result of concerns over 
prestige, security, and survival.  Certainly, the canals and irrigation systems of Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, and China contributed heavily to each country’s economic development and 
security,
115 but spectacular projects – such as the building of the Aswan Dam in Egypt - also 
enhanced the prestige and power of the rulers.
116  The need to control water supplies remains 
crucial to each country’s security and survival.  Egypt’s President Anwar el-Sadat, for instance, 
threatened to bomb water facilities in Ethiopia, where the main contributor to the Nile, the Blue 
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Nile, originates, if Ethiopia diverted water for irrigation projects.
117  Similarly, with Egypt, 
Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia all needing to feed burgeoning populations in an arid region of 
Africa, the danger of conflict grows significantly.
118  
  Tensions also exist in the basins of the Tigris-Euphrates and the Indus rivers.  These 
rivers, which provide the only significant amounts of water for their basins, supported a 
population of approximately five hundred million people in 1998 with one billion people 
expected by the middle of the twenty-first century.
119  The people living in these regions are 
divided ethnically and religiously and the rivers themselves often have deep symbolic meaning, 
suggesting that disputes over the rivers are likely to take on additional elements beyond that of 
the access to the water.
120  In addition, while the Nile features only one power, Egypt, with 
significant military might, these other basins feature many nation-states with substantial military 
capability.
121  Fortunately, these regions have made efforts to negotiate shared water agreements, 
but there are major demographic and ethnic pressures that could push disputes over water into 
explosive problems.
122 
  Countries sharing the Tigris-Euphrates River, for instance, are heavily dependent on the 
river for their freshwater needs, given the common aridity of the region.  The rivers are 
responsible for approximately thirty percent of Turkey’s needs, eighty-five percent of Syria’s 
needs, and one hundred percent of Iraq’s requirements.
123  In response to this dependence, 
several countries have constructed dams in order to control floods, generate power, and irrigate 
land.
124  Turkey has built three dams on the Euphrates and has plans for others in the Tigris; 
Syria has built one dam on the Euphrates with plans for another; and Iraq has built dams on both 
the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers.
125  Constructing these dams creates potential for reduced 
water flow and subsequent disputes for downriver countries heavily dependent on water from the 
rivers.  A dispute of this kind broke out in 1990 when Turkey essentially cut off the Euphrates 
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from Iraq and Syria in order to fill the Ataturk Dam Reservoir.
126  Because the cutoff was taken 
in the winter before the growing season, practical impacts were minimized, but the capability to 
control these waters raised serious concerns in downstream Iraq and Syria.
127  Linked  to 
demands by Turkey for Syria to exercise greater control over groups troublesome to Turkey, this 
control has resulted in a general sense of unease and potential conflict.
128  Moreover, greater 
needs for water to satisfy growing populations suggests the potential for ongoing conflict over 
the control of water flow.
129  
  The Jordan River basin has seen more than its share of violent conflict over the past fifty 
years.  Water stress is a hovering reality in all of the conflicts between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors.  Steps have been taken to attempt to minimize the water-related aspects of this 
conflict, although there are open questions regarding whether they have satisfactorily taken 
place.  Like the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates basins, the Jordan basin has also seen tremendous 
population growth.  Nearly seven times the number of people lived in the Jordan basin in the 
1970s as did in the 1920s with additional significant growth expected.
130  In the 1970s, the region 
as a whole began a period of water deficit, where more use was being made of water than was 
being replenished annually.
131  Israel in particular, has adopted a water management plan through 
the importation, rather than the growing, of food; if ninety-percent of an individual’s 1,000 
annual cubic meters of water needed
132 are for cereals, it makes sense to import rather than to 
grow food.
133 
  Yet, flashpoints remain because of the basic problem of a growing population in an arid 
climate.  Moreover, as in other cases, the distribution of water is not even.  A central point of 
contention in the basin is the Israeli strategy of protecting the annual recharge of the Mountain 
Aquifer in the West Bank, from which Israel obtains some of its water.  Israelis require 
Palestinians to obtain permission to sink wells on the West Bank land – where precipitation 
runoff flows to the Mountain Aquifer and thereby limits Palestinian use of water.
134  The result 
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of this and other policies is that Palestinians have access to one hundred five million cubic 
meters of groundwater while Israel makes use of four hundred fifty million cubic meters.
135  
Without making judgments as to the relative merits of various allocations, the perception created 
by this difference fuels animosity in the basin. 
 
4. Business  Complexities 
In recognizing the collisions between resource availability, population growth, and 
geopolitical quests for power, it is tempting to simply characterize these as issues of concern 
among nation-states.  Yet, this characterization would be simplistic.  It is true, for instance, that 
the contest for the extraction of oil from the Caspian Sea region pits Russia, the United States, 
Iran, Turkey, and other nations against one another.
136  Many disputes in the region center 
around disputed interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
137  For example Russia and Iran claim that the Caspian is a lake for which there are 
Soviet-Iranian treaties from the 1940s that control exploitation and distribution of resources.
138  
However, if the Caspian is a sea it is under the jurisdiction of UNCLOS.
139  But nation-states are 
not the only parties involved.  Russian energy firms such as Lukoil and Gazprom and Western 
companies such as BP-Amoco, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, Elf Aquitaine, Agip, 
Stat-oil, and China National Petroleum are also involved.
140  Pakistan’s support of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan as a way to secure oil transportation was borne of pressures and opportunities 
presented by oil companies.
141  Geopolitical control over natural resources provides security in 
making oil available to fuel tanks, jeeps, and airplanes.  Thus, the contests for control over 
resources is also very much one among business entities as well as governments.    
The situation in Africa provides an example of the complexity of business-and-
government relationships.  Although Africa is rife with innumerable disputes, major energy 
companies have not been prevented from working with local warlords to obtain agreements to 
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extract oil.
142  In this respect, Colin Powell’s claim that business will run away from dangerous 
situations
143 may not be as compelling as one might expect.  Or, to put it otherwise, businesses 
value stability, but when faced with an opportunity to secure a valuable resource, businesses, like 
governments, may resort to the methods necessary to benefit their own interest.  If this is true, 
however, there is reason to hold businesses accountable for their actions that contribute to the 
likelihood of violence; in short, contests for natural resources are not only governmental 
responsibilities.  
The same may be true with respect to water, such as with attempts to privatize water 
distribution.  In Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, there have been efforts to turn 
water services over to private ownership.
144  These efforts are not always warmly embraced, in 
part because of the specter of trying to profit from a resource that is essential to human survival.  
In other words, market-oriented solutions may not be perceived as appropriate for a public good, 
such as clean water. 
  Oil and water are obvious resources to examine because of their importance to human 
survivability and economic development.  But other natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, 
timber, and minerals, are valuable.
145  From the receipts generated by the sale of diamonds, for 
instance, the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone are able to pay wages to young boys to 
fight in civil wars equipped with inexpensive guns.
146  This is significant in light of a World 
Bank study that has found a twenty-fold likelihood of a civil war in countries where the primary 
export is a single undifferentiated commodity.
147  In Sierra Leone, up to fifty thousand people 
have been killed since 1991 with hundreds of thousands becoming refugees.
148  Multinational 
corporations are in the midst of this problem because of their desire for the commodity; thus 
DeBeers has been the target of considerable criticism for allegedly buying “blood diamonds.”
149  
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Not insignificantly, Liberia exported almost three hundred million dollars worth of diamonds to 
Belgium in 1998.
150  
Contests for lootable resources often entail significant ecological damage, such as with 
the case of clear-cutting valuable, old-timber forests.
151  Seventy-two percent of Liberia’s 2000 
timber trade was done in conjunction with French and Chinese companies.
152  This exploitation 
of natural resources was made possible through the arms trade; although not through the sale of 
fighter jets, AWACS surveillance systems, or nuclear know-how, but from the trade of 640 
million small arms and light weapons.
153  There is nearly one weapon for every person of 
Mogadishu’s 1.3 million population and an AK-47 in Mogadishu can be purchased for merely 
two hundred dollars.
154  In Aceh, Indonesia, an automatic rifle can be bought for the equivalent 
six U.S. dollars.
155  With hundreds of millions of dollars being gained by the extraction and 
export of natural resources, with cheap weapons readily available, with impoverished 
populations having little alternative means of income, it is unrealistic to lay the issue of war and 
peace at the feet of only nation-states.  Many more actors are involved and the very nature of 
geopolitical balances of power may be changing in response to the growing influence of 
multinational corporations.
156 
Thus, contests for natural resources are one example of how violence may erupt.  Often, 
however, it is not simply the possession of resources that gives rise to conflict.  As already noted, 
for instance, river basins that are shared by populations with different ethnic and religious 
memberships make it possible for contests over natural resources to also have a flavor of 
identity-based conflict.
157  The Caspian Sea area has long had deep ethnic divisions; and the 
arrival of competing oil companies has exacerbated those divisions.
158  The same is true of 
contests for lootable resources, such as diamonds and timber; they are embedded within historic 
antagonisms.
159 As a result, it is also important to examine how ecological issues can inflame 
identity-based tensions. 
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  B. Exacerbation of Identity Tensions 
  In his research on environmental scarcity and its connection to violence, Thomas Homer-
Dixon concludes that scarcity itself does not cause violent conflict, nor rarely does violence have 
a single cause.
160  Yet a great deal of violence, particularly with respect to violence occurring 
within preexisting borders, is causally related to environmental scarcity.
161  This includes 
violence that has occurred in Chiapas, Mexico, South Africa, Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
Haiti.
162  Homer-Dixon suggests that scarcities of cropland, freshwater, and forests contribute to 
violence by generating social stress that fosters “subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and 
urban unrest” and that developing countries are particularly prone to these disturbances because 
they are typically dependent on natural resources.
163  Thus, apart from the specific competition 
for a particular resource, it is also important to see how competition, or the spillover effects from 
such contests, can contribute to identity-based tensions that, in turn, can result in violence. 
 
1.  Uneven Distribution of Resources 
  Just as energy and water resources provide an initial lens through which to examine 
competition over natural resources, it is helpful to contextualize the issues that can arise from 
identity-based conflicts.  Homer-Dixon notes that forty percent of the people on the planet use 
fuel-wood, charcoal, straw, or cow dung as their main source of energy and up to sixty percent 
rely on these fuels for at least a part of their primary energy needs.
164  More than 1.2 billion 
people do not have access to clean drinking water.
165  The allocation of valuable resources is 
highly desired and the potentially increased marginalization of those mired in this level of 
poverty is likely to breed resentment.  There are at least two ways in which the distribution of 
resources can exacerbate simmering identity-based tensions. 
  The first maldistribution concerns resource capture or structural scarcity.
166  This occurs 
when some groups in a given society are able to recognize the value of scarce resources and then 
act to control large percentages of those resources.
167  Frequently, these powerful groups also 
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manipulate the power structure of society to access further resources.
168  Recently, two authors 
have provided perspectives on this issue. 
  Raimo Vayrynen focuses on rent-seeking activities.
169  Vayrynen describes the use of 
non-violent rivalries in the creation of “institutional structures and rules that benefit 
disproportionately some actors and marginalize others.”
170  These structures, Vayrynen argues, 
are typically applied theoretically to explain domestic inequalities, but they can just as 
effectively be applied internationally to explain how wealth can be allocated to favored groups 
through international institutions.
171  In return for these rents, benefited groups return political 
services; often resulting in corruption.
172  Free markets and democratic institutions threaten rent-
seeking activities because competition is enhanced, the relative power of the state decreases, and 
the relative power of and opportunities for bribery is decreased.
173  Generally speaking, Varyrnen 
argues rent-seeking and corruption foster violence by undermining the social fabric,
174 however, 
Varyrnen recognizes the possibility that rent-seeking might not foster violence when there is a 
perceived level of fairness of the redistribution policies of the state and, in some instances, when 
a patron-client kind of hierarchy has cultural validity in its own right. Varyrnen concludes that 
the connection between rent-seeking and corruption and violence and stability is not conclusive; 
stability is most at risk when the rent-seeking is monopolistic, pervasive, reckless, and 
centralized.
175  If the state has lost its power, through for instance, open markets, then it may be 
unable to keep order.
176  Consistent with Homer-Dixon’s insight, Varyrnen’s work maintains that 
governments are frequently structured to favor certain groups at the expense of others.    
  Amy Chua provides a similar argument and connects it specifically to ethnic violence.
177  
Chua’s argument is that the opportunities presented by free markets have been seized upon by 
minorities in many countries to significantly enrich themselves, but that majorities in those 
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countries remain impoverished.
178  Market-dominant minorities may be able to establish and to 
maintain power in a country
179 – apartheid in South Africa would be an extreme example – and 
they exist, she argues throughout the world.
180  She cites the role of the Chinese in the 
Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
181  In Indonesia, for example, Chinese Indonesians 
comprise only three percent of the population, but control seventy percent of the economy.
182  
Similar situations exist in Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, West Africa, Nigeria, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Russia.
183  The concentration of wealth, however, engenders hostility within 
countries that can be expressed when majority rule democracy comes with it; the majority then 
has the capability of scapegoating the wealthy minority, almost always with strongly ethnic 
overtones.
184  Chua argues further that this dynamic has consistently resulted in actions of mass 
murder by the minority against the market-dominant majority; Rwanda is another case in point as 
are actions in Zimbabwe against white farmers and actions against Chinese in Indonesia.
185  
Even more controversially, Chua argues that the same dynamic is at work with respect to Arab 
resentment of the regionally market-dominant power in the Middle East, Israel,
186 and against the 
United States as a globally market-dominant power in the September 11 attacks.
187  Thus, 
according to Chua, governments frequently take on the character of a privileged minority group 
in the position to benefit itself, at least as long as they can effectively control power and make 
arrangements to minimize opposition. 
 Environmental  scarcity  adds  to this dynamic.  It is one thing to observe that another 
ethnic group has better cars or homes.  It is another if that other group has clean water while 
one’s children suffer from dysentery caused by drinking dirty water.  As already demonstrated, 
this is one of the problematic perceptions articulated in the ongoing disputes between 
Palestinians and Israelis on the West Bank.
188  Given the expected population increases in those 
countries where access to a critical, basic resource such as water is expected to become even 
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harder to obtain, the prospects that environmental scarcity will provoke increased ethnic 
hostilities exists.  Adding to the potential is the visual connection provided by contemporary 
telecommunications and the Internet, where impoverished, suffering populations can see the 
glitter of the West.   
  A second maldistribution concerns what is done with the leftovers of resource use; that is 
ecological marginalization.
189  This scenario occurs when the structural distributions already in 
place join with population growth so that the poor, again typically from the same impoverished 
ethnic groups, are forced into ecologically marginal living quarters such as upland hillsides, land 
subject to desertification, and tropical rain forests.
190  This psychological resentment is not 
necessarily different from that of resource distribution generally; but living in a marginalized 
area contributes to ethnic resentments that can lead to uncontrollable eruptions.  As is the case 
with the location of petroleum and water, these resentments tend to be found in critically 
important areas of the world.
191  These places include South Africa, Mexico, Pakistan, India, and 
China, the latter two countries comprising over forty percent of the world’s population.
192   
  In both of these cases, the distribution of either benefits in terms of desired resources or 
costs in terms of living in degrading conditions, does not typically happen across a 
demographically neutral board.  Instead, certain groups tend to be favored while others tend to be 
disfavored.  Environmental scarcity thus sharpens the potential grievances of rivalries that may 
often already be simmering in a given country. 
 
2.  Struggle to Control Identity 
A related but distinguishable category is the struggle to control identity.  The previous 
discussion concerning the distribution of resources concerned primarily material costs and 
benefits as well as the social psychological reaction to them, this second category relates to 
threats to more spiritual identities.  These too, can create the conditions for ethnically related 
violence.   
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Rivers often are imbued with spiritual significance.
193  Whether it be a large river like the 
Nile,
194 or the Kunene River separating Angola and Namibia,
195 bodies of water, like other 
natural resources often embody a deep manifestation of the identity of people.  These 
identifications are critically important.  Thomas Friedman characterizes those things that anchor 
human beings to a rooted identity as “olive trees” and writes, “[o]live trees are important.  They 
represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world – whether 
it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place 
called home.”
196 
 Although  globalization  allows  for greater interaction among people to cooperate on a 
range of things that bordered-up societies previously could not have allowed, it also means that 
within countries, there remains the tug of the olive tree.
197  Re-routing and damming of rivers, 
clear-cutting forests, and punching holes in the ground can challenge the identities of people for 
whom these natural things have spiritual significance.  Globalization also challenges cultures in 
that things that were familiar are now gone, replaced by something strange.  To the extent this 
causes consternation in France about the prevalence of Big Macs and Mickey Mouse, this may 
not be a huge issue.
198  At the same time, as Friedman argues, when there is a sense that a 
community has lost control of its economic vitality, as has been the case when financial markets 
move money in and out of a country virtually overnight,
199 one is left with the feeling that no one 
is in charge except for an arbitrary, faceless market.
200  But, as Israeli political theorist Yaron 
Ezrahi notes: “The most arbitrary powers in history always hid under the claim of some 
impersonal logic –God, the laws of nature, the laws of the market – and they always provoked a 
backlash when morally intolerable discrepancies became glaringly visible.  The Enlightenment 
was really the globalization of science and rationality and the backlash came when every thief, 
crook, exploiter and fraud claimed that whatever he was doing was necessitated by science and 
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logic.  The same could happen with globalization.”
201  It is noteworthy that since the end of the 
Cold War, fewer than ten percent of contemporary wars have begun as interstate conflicts, but 
issues of religious, ethnic, or national identity have spurred two-thirds of wars.
202  In the West, 
where since the Enlightenment, it has been common to hear concerns raised about religious 
wars,
203 and statistics that show that over half of the wars had a religious dimension may not be 
surprising.  Yet, it is surprising that religious belief systems, which always venerated peace, are 
so intimately connected with contemporary conflict. 
  Scott Appleby, a leading authority on fundamentalist religious groups addresses one 
aspect of this.  Appleby concedes that raising the specter of violence is not normal for most 
religions, but argues that often the justification for resorting to violence is an argument that the 
times are not normal.
204  Indeed, evidence suggests that many times this characterization is made 
by groups faced with new threats.  Appleby argues that religious extremists typically do not 
mobilize orthodox believers; instead, they concentrate on the young and untutored during a time 
when outside pressures threaten traditional ways of life.
205  Thus, by shrinking time and space 
through communications and transportation technologies, modernity has made it much more 
likely that Sikhs, Buddhists, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, and nonbelievers live in close 
proximity to one another, especially in large urban areas around the world.  In this globalized 
milieu, religious extremism – with the violent intolerance of outsiders – has become the response 
of choice for a disproportionately influential minority within traditional religious communities 
that feel threatened by the new pluralism.
206  If believers, again typically the young and 
untutored, think they are threatened, then there is an obligation to fight the enemy by any 
means.
207  The threat is that orthodoxy has not adequately responded to the secular, pluralistic, 
materialist, feminist West.
208  Fundamentalist leaders who are often charismatic mold an attitude 
of absolute devotion to the will of God, demonizing the infidel, focusing almost exclusively on a 
very narrow subset of religious doctrine as being the key to religious truth and connecting that 
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truth to political goals.
209  “Thus the religious Zionists of the Ichud Rabbanim and their 
counterparts in the Gush Emunim emphasize one of the 613 Torah mitzvoth and subordinate the 
remaining 612 religious duties to its observance – the commandment to settle the land is 
tantamount to all other commandments."
210  In short, believers can latch on to a particularly 
important dimension of religious tradition – in the quoted example, physical real estate – and use 
adherence to that tradition to express rebellion against a cultural change.  Religion can thus be 
linked to ecological resources and thereby foster additional, militant violence.   
  Appleby’s account is respectful of religion as a whole, noting how religion can also be 
militantly devoted to peace.
211  In his account of fundamentalism, extremists distort a religious 
tradition that might otherwise be a force for nonviolence.  A more cynical view of religion, 
consistent with Varynen’s and Chua’s analysis of how a minority group can seize control of 
government and orient policies for personal benefit, is presented by anthropologist Jared 
Diamond.
212  Diamond argues that, historically, human beings tended to live in relatively small 
bands comprised of between five to eighty people, most of them closely related to each other.
213  
Although there were differences among the relative authority of individuals within these groups, 
a common feature was that the groups were relatively egalitarian.
214  There were no formal 
stratification of class hierarchy, no formal legal institutions, such as the police or even codes of 
law, and no monopolies of information or decision-making.
215  Yet human beings, beginning in 
the last few tens of thousands of years, also lived in tribes (usually populated by hundreds of 
people), clans, and chiefdoms.
216  Tribes,
217 like bands, also tended to be relatively egalitarian 
with little institutional formality.
218   
  When chiefdoms arose 7,500 years ago, there was potential for greater conflict because 
people lived in close proximity with others they did not know.
219  One solution was for the chief 
to hold a monopoly on force; ideally, that force would be used for the welfare of all members of 
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the chiefdom, but realistically the chief could also be a thief.
220  A kleptocracy could only 
flourish if there were reasons for common people to tolerate the transfer of wealth to the elite.
221  
Historically, those reasons were to:  (a) disarm the common people and arm the elite; (b) make 
the common people happy through redistribution of resources; (c) use force to create satisfaction 
through maintenance of a safe, public order; and (d) create an ideology or religion justifying the 
theft.
222  The last solution typically came in the form of a notion of the divine connection of 
royalty.
223  Moreover, the state ideology was able to bind non-kin together in conjunction with a 
common good that would justify even death for the welfare of others.
224  The idea of dying for 
the state, however Diamond argues, was unthinkable for bands and tribes.
225  Patriotism, he 
argues, was an unknown commodity.
226  Diamond argues that fanaticism in war was probably 
unknown until about six thousand years ago, the time when the great world religions emerged.
227  
  Regardless of Diamond’s conclusions about kleptocracy, the anthropological data 
concerning bands and tribes on the one hand and chiefdoms (and even larger organizations) on 
the other suggests potential for violence in a couple of ways.  First, within any large religious 
organization, there may be disaffected members who are reachable by those who articulate the 
dangers of a materialistic, secular threat.  Second, this threat may be articulated in some way by 
designating an ecological entity as paradigmatic of either that threat or the essential meaning of 
the religion.  This means that natural resources and landmarks which play a prominent role in 
most religious traditions of any size can be pulled into ecological conflict.   
 Thus,  identity-based  conflict can result from ecological issues.  This can occur through 
the sharpening of ethnic grievances resulting from one ethnic group obtaining more of the 
benefits of natural resources and fewer of the costs of environmental degradation.  It can also 
occur through the symbolic associations that the natural environment may carry, which become 
important for various reasons to religious believers.  Those adherents, whose faith may or may 
not be associated with a particular organized religion, may have their beliefs molded by attention 
to a natural, ecological resource.    
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  An overarching issue with respect to sustainability is the extent that a consumption-
driven economy can be supported by the natural environment.  Evidence mounts daily that 
humanity will be confronted this century with major consequences resulting from climate 
change.
228  Fossil fuels are thought to be the major cause of the greenhouse gas problem.
229  A 
central threat of climate change is a potential partial melting of polar icecaps, which would raise 
sea levels and cause severe costal flooding.
230  This connection of fossil fuel and flooding 
presents an entirely different dimension of the issues of oil and water described above.
231  Not 
only may oil and water be depleted, but there are also impacts on cropland scarcity, tropical 
deforestation, and depleted fish stocks.
232   
The world is faced with a complicated, difficult ecological condition which could provide 
the breeding ground for many kinds of violence, justified by those who believe that the current 
system has not treated them fairly.
233  It may be comforting to believe that these issues are the 
province of governments.  It seems somewhat unrealistic to believe that governments can solve 
these issues without the engaged thoughtfulness of the business sector.   
 
II.  The Business Implications 
Regardless of whether the evidence is sufficient to insist on the accountability of business 
to the connection of war and peace, many places around the world are already making the 
connection.  As we have already noted, Shell Oil Co., a company currently recognized for its 
social responsibility efforts, was once vilified for its alleged complicity in the oppression of the 
Ogoni people in Nigeria and its alleged involvement in the assassination of rebel leader Ken 
Saro-Wiwa.
234  Exxon has faced protests from human rights organizations for not confronting 
human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces protecting Exxon’s pipeline in Indonesia.
235  
Apart from ecological examples, disgruntled consumers attacked McDonald’s restaurants by 
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breaking windows and smearing the walls with cow dung after it was learned that, contrary to 
previous announcements, its French fries were cooked in oil containing beef tallow rather than in 
vegetable oil.
236  Hindus who had inadvertently violated religious precepts by eating these fries 
as well as vegetarians were outraged.
237  In January, 2002, Argentine protestors ransacked a 
McDonald’s restaurant in Buenos Aires
238 and the McDonald’s in Quebec City simply closed 
and removed all identifying signs in advance of the 2001 Summit of the Americas to avoid 
attracting the interest of demonstrators.
239  Protests against banks in Argentina
240 and Wal-Mart 
stores in Bonn
241 are additional examples of how corporations are increasingly targeted as 
responsible parties for a variety of perceived social injustices.   
It may or may not be fair for businesses to be targets for protests and it also may be true 
that governments are responsible for managing the resulting conflicts.  But business is involved 
in all of these issues.  Although it may not be a moral requirement for corporations to take 
responsibility for the issues connected with violence, it would benefit both business and society 
if they did.  As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Arab nationalism, socialism, fascism or communism – 
while they may have made no economic sense, had a certain inspirational power.  But 
globalization totally lacks this.  When you tell a traditional society it has to streamline, downsize 
and get with the Internet, it is a challenge that is devoid of any redemptive or inspirational force.  
And that is why, for all of globalization’s obvious power to elevate living standards, it is going to 
be a tough sell to those millions of people who still say a prayer before they ride the elevator.”
242 
It is plausible that business can do something to contribute to sustainable peace, a peace 
that endures because it is just.  Engaging that connection could well be the free market’s way of 
addressing the social void
243 that transactional economics cannot.  Businesses are engines of 
economic development that can be beneficial to social harmony.  On one hand, through 
globalization, businesses consistently reach across borders to allow people from far away places 
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to gain understanding of each other by working together in ways that would otherwise not be 
possible.  Businesses can do this in creating diverse work forces where members of different 
ethnic groups may work together for a common project – even if that project is simply that of 
economic profitability – for the first time.  Businesses may be able to, on occasion, mediate 
conflicts between governments.  On the other hand, if businesses are viewed as being 
exploitative, culturally undermining, greedy, or socially insensitive, they can sow the seeds for 
potential violence.   
Thomas Homer-Dixon
244 argues that protection from the dilemmas concerning 
environmental scarcity depends on having better governance to protect the environment, human 
rights, labor standards, and financial transactions despite no global government.
245  Solving these 
problems requires, he argues, technical ingenuity.  That kind of creativity depends on social 
ingenuity together with adequate background institutions to support public and semi-public 
goods such as markets, funding agencies, educational and research institutions, and effective 
governments.
246  Other commentators have argued further that the natural world provides 
business models, such as biological mimicry, that can be source for ecologically sensitive 
management.
247  Out of the natural environment, therefore, are models for thinking about how 
businesses can make significant contributions to sustainable peace.   
Regardless of the particular source, approaching issues of ecology and war draw upon the 
approach we have articulated.  That is, preventing war is not about one thing.  It is about many 
things.  Business finds itself in the midst of most all of them and, as a result, has some 
contribution to make to all of them.  A balanced approach of economic development, openness to 
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external evaluation, building community (including ecological citizenry), and track-two 
diplomacy, can mediate many of the tensions exacerbated by natural resource stresses. 
 
III.    Disease and War 
  As products of nature, human beings are also directly affected by ecological and 
biological elements.  Just as human beings need natural resources, particularly water, in order to 
exist, so also a disruption in biospherical equilibrium can make life impossible.  Thus, the issue 
of disease and war is not neutral when it comes to the lethal nature of disease; war enhances it 
and sometimes promote it.  Nor is business neutral to disease.  Outbreaks of disease, such as 
sudden acute respiratory syndrome, can wreak havoc on economic affairs.  So here again, 
business has an interest in the containment of disease and because war works against that 
containment, disease can be seen as something of the ultimate ecological challenge to human life 
- the challenge to our physical bodies. 
  War can foster deadly diseases as an incidental weapon and by undermining the 
capability of societies to control their spread.  Jared Diamond argues that Europeans were able to 
have military success and dominance over native populations because Europeans had guns, the 
nastiest germs, and steel.
248  In the Spanish conquest of the Incas, Francisco Pizarro’s band of 
168 soldiers were able to rout an Incan army of eight thousand without any Spanish casualties.
249  
The use of horses, the sharpness of Spanish weapons, and the protective armor provided against 
Incan clubs turned the Battle of Cajamarca into a spectacle.
250  Even so, the Spaniards may not 
have succeeded had not the Incan Empire already been stricken with an epidemic of smallpox for 
which the Incans had no resistance.
251  This, according to Diamond, captures one of the essential 
reason for European imperial success: “diseases transmitted to peoples lacking immunity by 
invading peoples with considerable immunity.”
252  Smallpox was also crucial in South Africa in 
1713.
253  In Hawaii, after being discovered by Captain James Cook in 1778, the native 
population shrunk from approximately 800,000 to 135,000 in just forty-five years and further 
shrunk to just under 40,000 by 1896 due to the spread of venereal disease, tuberculosis, measles, 
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mumps, whooping cough, small pox, cholera, leprosy and a disease resembling typhoid fever, all 
introduced by Westerners.
254  Between 1520 and 1618, Mexico’s population is estimated to have 
dropped from 20 million to 1.6 million from disease.
255  For the New World as a whole, the 
native population is estimated to have been reduced by as much as 95% within two centuries 
following Columbus’s landing.
256  More than swords and spears, most of the killings came from 
smallpox, measles, influenza, typhus, diphtheria, malaria, mumps, pertussis, plague, tuberculosis, 
and yellow fever.
257 
  A possible reason for the lack of immunity of native peoples and the robust immunity of 
Europeans is the prevalence of domesticated animals.  Diamond argues that, with agriculture, a 
smaller amount of land was able to feed larger groups of people who lived in nomadic hunter-
gatherer bands.
258  Larger societies possessed their own military advantages over small bands in 
terms of manpower, but in addition, the domestication of animals led to their trained use.  This 
increased the possibility for specialization once animals were trained and fewer hands were 
needed to provide food, people could instead make weapons and build buildings and larger 
governments.
259  Moreover, because domesticated animals, including household pets such as 
dogs and cats, carry with them disease, the resulting density of human and animal populations 
allowed their immune systems to develop, even in the face of highly mutated diseases such as 
smallpox, measles, and flu.
260  These mutated diseases may have been frustrated by the 
immunities of Europeans and their animals, but the diseases faced no resistance from native 
populations.
261  Agricultural societies then, with their specialization of labor, their stores of food 
to feed armies, their ability to support large populations, and their ability to build up resistance to 
diseases were at a tremendous advantage over populations of native peoples.
262  As Diamond 
rather colorfully puts it, a naked farmer has no advantage over a naked hunter-gatherer, but 
because the farmer breathes out nastier germs (excluding the possibility that he may also have 
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armor and horse), the farmer is more likely to prevail.
263  The densities accompanying urban life 
make the immunity issue even more pronounced.
264 
  Globalization and its associated mobility puts people into contact with each other at a rate 
previously unimagined.
265  And, not surprisingly, fatal diseases such as AIDS have been linked 
to infections that seem to have jumped from animals (specifically monkeys in Africa) to human 
beings and have spread very quickly around the world due to mobility and the lack of immunity 
to the disease.
266  Disease thus represents a major ecological threat to the physical well-being of 
human beings and that threat is one that has been part of violent conquests of other peoples.  The 
basic threat to ecological devastation as a part of warfare has an unfortunately deep history.
267 
  Even in warfare, at least until World War II, and probably continuing in wars in emerging 
countries, more soldiers die as a result of disease than wounds.
268  The reason for battlefield 
deaths through disease is that battlefields do not posses public health infrastructures.  Battlefields 
are not designed for providing safe drinking water, shelter from the elements, and pristine 
latrines.  What occurs on the battlefield can be a spillover effect from war itself insofar as public 
health infrastructures are destroyed as battles are fought or, in an age where the separation 
between civilian and military populations may not be valued, attacking the infrastructure may 
even be a tactical decision.   
  “War [is] not healthy for children and other living things.”
269  The actual collision with 
weaponry can be fatal, but war also loosens diseases.  Once disease outbreaks, as in the case of 
AIDS for instance, it is difficult to control it.  Disease itself wreaks human ecological destruction 
in ways sometimes even more devastating than fighting battles.  
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Conclusion 
In his interviews with leading CEOs, former Yale Business School Dean Jeffrey E. 
Garten concludes that CEOs should take “a broader agenda” that goes beyond philanthropy and 
beyond the typical commissions, trade, associations, and lobbying.
270  That this has not been 
done is not a criticism of CEOs, he argues, but a missed opportunity.
271  Similarly, it seems that 
not engaging business in a quest for sustainable peace is also a missed opportunity.   
Businesses have power and influence.  They are functioning, productive institutions.   
Corruption seems to be linked to violence.  Gender equity seems to be correlated with less 
violence.  Poverty resulting from lack of economic opportunity is linked to violence.  Democratic 
kinds of participation and voice can be linked to peace.  Corporations can help reduce corruption 
by being transparent.  They can provide more equitable treatment of women.  They can 
contribute to economic development and in ways that are widely distributed.  They can be 
managed in a participatory way that embraces the voice of employees and other stakeholders and 
thus demonstrate democratic values. 
Disease and war are linked.  Diseases can be used as a weapon of war and can be a 
consequence as well.  Disease has also served as a metaphor for war as well.  Nobel Laureaute 
Albert Camus analogizes the isolating, suffocating and dehumanizing dimensions of the bubonic 
plague to the scourge of Naziism and war.
272  Although many actors – governments, health 
authorities, and others – had primary responsibility for battling the plague, Camus’s heroes were 
ordinary people who did their job the best they could each day and in doing so, made a 
continuous dent in the brutality of the disease.
273  These bookkeepers, doctors, reporters, and 
others preserved a humanity threatened by disease.   
Businesspeople too can make contributions daily to contribute to sustainable peace and 
reduce the potential of violence.  Individually, no one person nor no one business is likely to 
prevent a war but businesspeople can make contributions that matter.  Camus once wrote that 
“perhaps this world is one in which children suffer, but we can reduce the number of suffering 
children.  And if you do not do this, then who will do this.”
274  Today that can be paraphrased.  
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Perhaps this is a world in which there is warfare.  But businesspeople can reduce the amount of 
violence in the world.  And if they do not do this, then who will? 
We propose sustainable peace as an aim to which businesses should orient their actions 
both for reasons of the good of avoiding the activities that contribute to the spilling of blood as 
well as for the promotion of sustainable economic enterprises, which are fostered by stable, 
peaceful relationships.  Thus, business must do what it does best and address economic 
development, even in terms of the extraction of natural resources.  But it must also be attentive to 
the rights of others, to the development of community and meaning, and to stop violence when it 
is likely.  Given the dangers ecological stresses pose for the planet, it is hard to think of a more 
compelling reason to reorient business behavior. 
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